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Abstract
We propose a model on strategic formation of communication networks with (i) link specificity:
the more direct links somebody maintains, the less she can specify her attention per link, the
lower her links’ value, while this negative externality was previously ignored in the communication
context, and (ii) value transferability via indirect links for informational but not for social value
from communication, while this positive externality was modeled uniformly before. Assuming only
social value to isolate the impact of link specificity, the pairwise stable set includes many non-
standard networks under high or particular combinations of fully connected components under
low link specificity. Allowing for social and informational value, the joint eﬀect of link specificity
and value transferability reduces the stable set to certain fragmented networks under high or the
complete network under low link specificity. These extremes are beneficial for eﬃciency, whereas
quite ineﬃcient networks may arise for intermediate link specificity.
JEL classification: A14, C79, D85, M31
Keywords: Bilateral communication links, Link specificity, Value transferability, Social vs. in-
formational value, Strategic network formation
1 Introduction
Structures of who communicates with whom are distinguishing empirical phenomena (e.g., Trier,
2008) and can determine important outcome variables such as the extent to which value is shared
throughout a community and how it is distributed (e.g., Granovetter, 2005; Ren et al., 2007).
Therefore, in the current paper we study the structure of bilateral communication links among
individuals. We model their formation as a game-theoretic network formation process in which
agents choose to create and maintain links, only if the participants in the link benefit from doing
so, which results in a pairwise stable network (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). The model thus de-
scribes how agents benefit and lose from being connected and predicts which stable communication
networks emerge when agents myopically maximize the resulting payoﬀ value. Herein, we incor-
porate a combination of two important aspects common to communication networks that has not
been investigated before.
First, our model features link specificity in the sense that the more direct connections an
individual has to maintain with other individuals, the less she is able to specify her attention
per link. Therefore, her value per link for others declines and she also derives less value from each
link with others (Currarini, 2007; co-author model Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Thus, we go
beyond the standard assumption of a fixed cost per link in communication networks (e.g., Bala and
Goyal, 2000; connections model Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).
We assume that two connected agents contribute to their bilateral process of communication
value creation according to a standard production function with as inputs the amount of time
invested by each agent in the link. Higher link specificity implies higher output elasticities in each
bilateral value production process and therefore lower advantage of being connected with several
agents. Unit output elasticities are adopted to analyze high link specificity, while constant returns
to scale, i.e., both output elasticities equal to 1/2, reflect low link specificity.
Second, we introduce the important distinction between social and informational value as mo-
tivations for bilateral exchange decisions. This typology was suggested by the virtual community
literature regarding the question why individuals choose to participate in and contribute to such a
community as a whole (e.g., Dholakia et al., 2004). Social value is related to the fact that individu-
als may enjoy communicating with others, for example because they find it entertaining or because
they feel it enhances their self-worth. Informational value refers to the fact that individuals may
obtain new valuable knowledge from others when they communicate. Typically, informational value
can be transferred relatively easily to third parties through indirect links, whereas social value is
more personal and therefore hardly transferable without creating a direct link.
To understand the relative impact of social and informational member orientation, we assume
that social value is only experienced from direct neighbors and that informational value flows via
any path consisting of bilateral communication links connecting two agents. Hereby, we integrate
transferable and nontransferable value in one model, while so far, value transferability was at best
incorporated uniformly for all value (e.g., Bala and Goyal, 2000; connections model Jackson and
Wolinsky, 1996).
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More specifically, we first deal with the case of communication having social value only (Section
2) in order to illustrate the separate impact of link specificity on network structure. When link
specificity is high, the set of pairwise stable networks is characterized by two simple conditions
and is shown to contain a wide range of non-standard networks, including highly connected and
“small world” networks, whereas previous models for social and economic network formation mostly
predicted simple networks like stars and wheels. When link specificity is low, particular combina-
tions of fully connected components are pairwise stable, similar to the prediction of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) for the co-author context.
Next, we deal with the case of communication from which both social and informational value is
derived (Section 3) in order to illustrate the impact of value transferability on structure. Under high
link specificity, only networks that consist of disjoint star components of two or three agents are
shown to be pairwise stable. Apparently, the combination of these two features: high link specificity,
which is an example of a negative network externality, and even marginal informational value
transferability, which is an example of a positive network externality (Asvanund et al., 2004), has
a strong fragmentizing eﬀect on the emerging pairwise stable networks. Under low link specificity,
the opposite eﬀect takes place: already with small informational value transferability, only the
complete network is pairwise stable.
Section 4 focuses on eﬃciency properties of the wide variety of stable networks discussed in
the previous two sections. In particular, it is found that both the fragmentation under high link
specificity and the dense stable networks under low link specificity are most eﬃcient in their own
setting. In Section 5, link specificity values other than 1 and 1/2 are investigated by simulations.
Especially, it is found that 1 and 1/2 are indeed suitable polar cases and that for intermediate link
specificity values the common tension between stability and eﬃciency (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996) is re-established. Subsequently, Section 6 concludes and oﬀers directions for further research.
2 Nontransferable social value
Since the structure of a communication network determines value for participants, we capture its
formation in a game-theoretical model. Although we believe that communication networks typically
combine social and informational value aspects, we first deal with the simpler case in which only
social value is derived from communication. This approach allows us to illustrate the separate
impact of link specificity on communication structure and to exclude value transferability.
Link specificity (Currarini, 2007; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) means that the more direct
connections an individual has to maintain with other individuals, the less she is able to specify
her attention per link. Therefore, her value per link for others declines and she also derives less
value from each link with others. These negative externalities of link formation are crucial in our
communication context, since here no benefits arise from individual contributions as such. The
reason is that communication is only valuable if it is two-sided, thus eﬀort has to be invested by
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both sender and receiver.1
In short, the objective of this section is to develop a model for communication network formation
with only social value from communication. We use the concept of pairwise stability to characterize
the collection of stable communication networks.
2.1 Model and stability concept
A communication network is described by (N, g), where N = {1, ..., n} , n ≥ 3, is a community of
agents. A direct link gi,j between agents i and j in this community (i, j ∈ N ; i 6= j) is interpreted
as a communication relationship between i and j which is established if they both wish the link; gi,j
indicates with a 1 or a 0 whether i is directly linked to j or not. These relationships are expressed
by undirected links: for any two agents i and j, gi,j = gj,i. By definition, gi,i = 0, as agents do not
establish communication links with themselves. In this community agents only derive social value
from interaction.
In case of an isolated relationship between two agents, each agent experiences social value
V s > 0 as the outcome of their joint communication production process. However, maintenance
of the communication relationship costs eﬀort: investment of both agents is needed in order to
make the communication specific to their personal circumstances and hence useful. Accordingly,
in case of a network where two agents do not form an isolated pair, both agents are assumed to
divide their eﬀort equally among all their relationships, as a result of which, in an extreme case, the
potential social communication value is divided proportionally by the number of links that agents
face. However, since agents may have economies of scale in coping with several links, the extent of
link specificity can be smaller.
We assume that the contributions of two agents in their bilateral process of communication
value creation are reflected by a Cobb-Douglas production function with the time invested in the
link by the agents as inputs. We assume both output elasticities are equal to ρ, where ρ = 1
corresponds to the case of high link specificity and ρ = 1/2 coincides with constant returns to scale
and results in low link specificity. Therefore, the total payoﬀ for agent i in communication network
g is given by
Πi (g) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
P
j∈Ni(g)
V s
(μi(g)·μj(g))
ρ if μi (g) > 0
0 if μi (g) = 0,
(1)
where Ni (g) is the set of agents with whom i has a direct link, agent j is a neighbor of agent i if
j ∈ Ni (g), and μi (g) = |Ni (g)| is the number of neighbors of agent i, which is also referred to as
the degree of i ; V s > 0 denotes the social value that i would derive from communication with j if
neither i nor j were linked to any other agent; and ρ ≤ 1 indicates the level of link specificity.2
1 In contrast, in the co-author setting, which has been the subject of investigation in earlier research (Jackson and
Wolinsky, 1996), each co-author can write independently as well.
2For comparison: the payoﬀ function in the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) can be written as
Πi (g) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
S
j∈Ni(g)

V s
μi(g)
+ V
s
μj(g)
+ V
s
μi(g)·μj(g)

if μi (g) > 0
0 if μi (g) = 0.
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For the model thus described we predict which stable networks emerge by using the concept
of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), where a network is stable if no single agent
can strictly improve her payoﬀ by deleting one of her direct links and no pair of agents can both
weakly improve their payoﬀs by creating a direct link while at least one of the two members strictly
improves her payoﬀ by doing so. This solution concept is weak in the sense that it only assumes
stability against deviations of exactly one link (which involves the permission of two agents in the
case of link formation), reflecting a form of myopia. Alternatively, the model could be analyzed by
applying the Nash solution (Bala and Goyal, 2000), which assumes stability against single-agent
deviations of more than one link. Because of the extreme coordination problem of the Nash concept
in two-sided link formation and since the weak concept of pairwise stability already clearly and
interestingly constrains the number of communication networks that are stable, we choose for the
pairwise stability solution. The study of farsighted stability notions in the setting of communication
networks, following the approaches of for instance the largest pairwise consistent set (Chwe, 1994)
or the pairwise farsightedly stable set (Herings et al., 2009) is left for future research.
In our notation, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (pairwise stability) The network g is pairwise stable if for all i, j ∈ N with gi,j = 1
it holds that
Πi (g) ≥ Πi
¡
g0
¢
and Πj (g) ≥ Πj
¡
g0
¢
,
where g0 is such that g0i,j = 0 and g
0
k,c = gk,c for all {k, c} 6= {i, j}, and for all i, j ∈ N with gi,j = 0
it holds that
Πi (g) > Πi
¡
g0
¢
or
Πj (g) > Πj
¡
g0
¢
or¡
Πi (g) = Πi
¡
g0
¢
and Πj (g) = Πj
¡
g0
¢¢
,
where g0 is such that g0i,j = 1 and g
0
k,c = gk,c for all {k, c} 6= {i, j}.
2.2 Stable networks under high link specificity
First, we evaluate pairwise stability in communication networks under high link specificity, which
we obtain by setting ρ = 1. We prove that in this case, the collection of pairwise stable networks
can be described by two easily verifiable conditions: (i) they are what we call equal neighbor degree
networks, meaning that everybody has at least one neighbor and all neighbors of an agent has the
same degree, and (ii) there is at most a diﬀerence of one between the degrees of agents in the same
component.
Definition 2 (equal neighbor degree network) A network g is an equal neighbor degree net-
work when it holds for each i ∈ N that μi (g) ≥ 1 and for all j, j0 ∈ Ni (g) that μj (g) = μj0 (g). Here
we adopt the following notation: the own degree of an agent i is denoted by di and her neighbors’
degree by ei.
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Definition 3 (path) A path in g connecting i and j is a sequence of agents k1, . . . , km ∈ N for
whom it holds that gi,k1 = gk1,k2 = ... = gkm−1,km = gkm,j = 1.
Definition 4 (component) A component c in g is a network among a set of agents C ⊆ N for
whom it holds that for all i, j ∈ C, i 6= j, there exists a path in c connecting i and j, and for any
i ∈ C and j ∈ N, gi,j = 1 implies ci,j = 1.
Definition 5 (star) A network g is a star if it has exactly n − 1 links and there exists an agent
j for whom it holds that gj,i = 1 for all i 6= j. Similarly, a component c is a star if it has exactly
|C|− 1 links and it contains an agent j for whom it holds that gj,i = 1 for any other i ∈ C. Agent
j is called the center agent whereas the other agents are the periphery agents of the star.
Example 1 A network consisting of star components is an equal neighbor degree network.
Example 2 The network given in Figure 1 is an equal neighbor degree network.
Figure 1: An equal neighbor degree network
Before providing the main result in Proposition 1, we first derive Lemma 1. It observes that
under high link specificity, pairwise stable communication networks must be equal neighbor degree
networks since it is beneficial for an agent i to delete the link with a neighbor who has to maintain
more direct links than i’s average neighbor. Furthermore, Lemma 1 expresses a condition to exclude
link creation.
Lemma 1 When ρ = 1, a communication network is pairwise stable if and only if it is an equal
neighbor degree network where it holds for each not directly linked pair of agents i, j that
ei ≤ dj or ej ≤ di or (ei = dj + 1 and ej = di + 1) . (2)
Proof. (⇐=) Assume that g is an equal neighbor degree network where for each not directly linked
pair of agents i, j condition (2) is satisfied. The payoﬀ of an agent i as expressed in equation (1)
can be written as
Πi (g) =
P
j∈Ni(g)
V s
μi(g)μj(g)
= di V
s
diei
= V
s
ei
,
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so i does not want to delete a link, for then her payoﬀ would reduce to zero if di = 1, whereas if
di > 1 it would remain equal:
(di − 1) V
s
(di−1)ei =
V s
ei
.
Moreover, no link between any pair of agents i, j is created if it makes either i or j strictly worse
oﬀ or both of them equally well oﬀ. Therefore, no link is created if
V s
ei
> di V
s
(di+1)ei
+ V
s
(di+1)(dj+1)
or (3)
V s
ej
> dj V
s
(dj+1)ej
+ V
s
(di+1)(dj+1)
or (4)³
V s
ei
= di V
s
(di+1)ei
+ V
s
(di+1)(dj+1)
and V
s
ej
= dj V
s
(dj+1)ej
+ V
s
(di+1)(dj+1)
´
. (5)
The following shows that ei ≤ dj implies (3):
ei ≤ dj =⇒ ei + di(dj + 1) < (di + 1)(dj + 1) =⇒ di(dj+1)+ei(di+1)(dj+1)ei <
1
ei
.
Analogously, it can be shown that ej ≤ di implies (4), and (ei = dj + 1) and (ej = di + 1) implies
(5). Therefore, g is pairwise stable.
( =⇒ ) Assume that the network g is pairwise stable. First, suppose that there is an agent i for
whom it holds that μi (g) = 0. Then her payoﬀ would strictly improve from a link with some other
agent k. It is obvious that also k ’s payoﬀ would strictly increase if μk (g) = 0, which contradicts
pairwise stability, so consider the case where μk (g) ≥ 1. The payoﬀ of k without this link equals
P
j∈Nk(g)
V s
μk(g)·μj(g) =
V s
μk(g)
Ã P
j∈Nk(g)
1
μj(g)
!
,
whereas by linking with i it would become
P
j∈Nk(g)
V s
(μk(g)+1)·μj(g) +
V s
(μk(g)+1)·1 =
V s
(μk(g)+1)
Ã P
j∈Nk(g)
1
μj(g)
+ 1
!
≥ V sμk(g)
Ã P
j∈Nk(g)
1
μj(g)
!
.
The inequality follows from the observation that the expression before the inequality equals V s
times the average of the terms 1/μj(g), j ∈ Nk (g) , and 1, the expression after the inequality is
equal to V s times the average of the terms 1/μj(g), j ∈ Nk (g) , and that 1 ≥ 1/μj(g) for all
j ∈ Nk(g). This contradicts pairwise stability of g. It follows that μi (g) ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N .
Secondly, suppose that for some i it does not hold that μj (g) is constant for all j ∈ Ni (g).
Then there is an agent k ∈ Ni (g) such that
μk (g) >
S
j∈Ni(g)
μj(g)
μi(g)
.
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The payoﬀ for i is given by
P
j∈Ni(g)
V s
μi(g)·μj(g) =
V s
μi(g)
P
j∈Ni(g)
1
μj(g)
,
whereas by deleting the link with k, the payoﬀ for i would become
P
j∈Ni(g)
V s
(μi(g)−1)·μj(g) −
V s
(μi(g)−1)·μk(g) =
V s
(μi(g)−1)
Ã P
j∈Ni(g)
1
μj(g)
− 1μk(g)
!
> V
s
μi(g)
P
j∈Ni(g)
1
μj(g)
,
where the inequality follows immediately from the interpretation of the last two terms as V s times
an average of numbers 1/μj(g), j ∈ Ni (g) . This contradicts pairwise stability, so μj (g) = μj0 (g)
for all j, j0 ∈ Ni (g). We have shown that a pairwise stable network is an equal neighbor degree
network.
Finally, suppose that there exists a not directly linked pair i, j for which condition (2) is not
satisfied, implying
ei ≥ dj + 1 and ej ≥ di + 1 and (ei > dj + 1 or ej > di + 1) . (6)
Then i and j want to create a link between them, since this would cause the payoﬀ for agent i to
become
di V
s
(di+1)ei
+ V
s
(di+1)(dj+1)
≥ di V
s
(di+1)ei
+ V
s
(di+1)ei
= V
s
ei
,
and for agent j to become
dj V
s
(dj+1)ej
+ V
s
(dj+1)(di+1)
≥ dj V
s
(dj+1)ej
+ V
s
(dj+1)ej
= V
s
ej
,
where according to the last condition in (6) at least one of the inequality signs is strict. This
contradicts pairwise stability too. Therefore, g is an equal neighbor degree network where condition
(2) holds for each not directly linked pair of agents i, j.
The condition to exclude link creation in Lemma 1 can be further simplified, leading to the
following main result.
Proposition 1 When ρ = 1, a communication network is pairwise stable if and only if it is an
equal neighbor degree network where it holds for each pair of agents k, c in the same component that
|dk − dc| ≤ 1. (7)
Proof. Considering Lemma 1, it is suﬃcient to show that in an equal neighbor degree network
condition (2) holds for each not directly linked pair i, j if and only if condition (7) is satisfied for
each pair k, c in the same component.
(⇐=) Assume an equal neighbor degree network where for each pair k, c in the same component
condition (7) is satisfied. Let i, j be any not directly linked pair. If ei ≤ dj , condition (2) is satisfied.
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If not, then ei > dj and we can derive by applying condition (7) twice that
ej ≤ dj + 1 ≤ ei ≤ di + 1.
If ej ≤ di, condition (2) is satisfied. If not, then ej = di + 1 and condition (2) is satisfied if it also
holds that ei = dj + 1. Suppose not, then ei ≥ dj + 2 and we can derive by applying condition (7)
that
ei ≥ dj + 2 ≥ (ej − 1) + 2 = di + 2,
which contradicts condition (7). Therefore, condition (2) is satisfied.
( =⇒ ) Assume an equal neighbor degree network where for each not directly linked pair i, j
condition (2) is satisfied. Let k, c be any pair in the same component, so there exists at least one
path between k and c. Assume that the total number of agents on any of these paths is odd. Due
to the equal neighbor degree network it holds that dk = dc, so condition (7) is satisfied.
Assume that the total number of agents on all of these paths is even. We consider three cases.
(i) Nk (g) \ {c} = ∅ and Nl (g) \ {k} = ∅. It follows that the component consists of k and c only,
so condition (7) trivially holds.
(ii) Nk (g) \ {c} 6= ∅ and Nl (g) \ {k} 6= ∅. Consider m ∈ Nk (g) \ {c}. Due to the equal neighbor
degree network it holds that
dk = em = ec and ek = dm = dc.
Since c and m are not directly linked, by condition (2) we have
dk = ec ≤ dm = dc or dk = em ≤ dc or (dk = ec = dm + 1 = dc + 1 and dk = em = dc + 1) ,
so dk ≤ dc + 1. By the same argument, using some n ∈ Nc (g) \ {k}, we find dc ≤ dk + 1.
Consequently, condition (7) is satisfied.
(iii) (Without loss of generality) Nk (g) \ {c} = ∅ and Nl (g) \ {k} 6= ∅. Since k is connected to c,
we have Nk (g) = {c}, dk = 1, k ∈ Nc (g), and dc ≥ 2. As in case (ii), using some m ∈ Nc (g) \ {k} ,
it follows that dc ≤ dk + 1 = 2. Therefore, it holds that dc = 2. Due to the equal neighbor degree
network we find dm = dk = 1. We have shown that g is a three-agent star. Clearly, condition (7)
holds.
The following examples illustrate the wide range of networks thus proven to be pairwise stable
in the social value case.
Definition 6 (complete network) A network g is complete if all agents are connected, so for all
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, it holds that gi,j = 1.
Definition 7 (wheel network) A network g is a wheel if it has exactly n links and there exists a
sequence of diﬀerent agents k1, ..., kn ∈ N for whom it holds that gk1,k2 = gk2,k3 = ... = gkn−1,kn =
gkn,k1 = 1.
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Definition 8 (regular network) A network g is regular if it exists of one component and for
each i ∈ N it holds that di = d.
Corollary 1 When ρ = 1, the complete, wheel, or any regular communication network is pairwise
stable, for it is an equal neighbor degree network where it holds for each pair of agents k, c in the
single component that
|dk − dc| = 0 ≤ 1.
Example 3 A non-regular communication network that is pairwise stable under ρ = 1 is given in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: A non-regular pairwise stable communication network for ρ = 1
Example 4 A communication network consisting of multiple components that is pairwise stable
under ρ = 1 is given in Figure 3.
Example 5 A “small world” is a network with local clusters of highly interlinked agents together
with agents that link the various clusters. As a consequence, although most agents are not directly
connected, every agent is indirectly linked to every other agent by a relatively small number of
steps. A regular “small world” communication network that is pairwise stable under ρ = 1 is given
in Figure 4.
Note that this wide set of stable communication networks includes complex real-life networks (as
empirically observed by e.g. Dodds et al., 2003), whereas previous models for social and economic
network formation mostly predicted simple networks like stars and wheels (e.g., Bala and Goyal,
2000; Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007).
2.3 Stable networks under low link specificity
In this section we study the case of low link specificity, obtained by setting ρ = 1/2. We show that
particular combinations of fully connected components are pairwise stable communication networks.
This is similar to the prediction for the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), where a
pairwise stable network can be partitioned into fully connected components, each of which has a
9
Figure 3: A multiple-component pairwise stable communication network for ρ = 1
Figure 4: A “small world” pairwise stable communication network for ρ = 1
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diﬀerent number of members: if mc1 is the number of members of one such component and mc2 is
the next largest size, then mc1 > (mc2)
2. We obtain a diﬀerent condition because of the diﬀerence
in payoﬀ functions (see Section 2.1).
Proposition 2 Consider a communication network g consisting of fully connected components
c1, . . . , ck with mc1 ≥ mc2 ≥ · · · ≥ mck , where mcj is the number of members of cj . When ρ = 1/2
it holds that g is pairwise stable if and only if mck ≥ 2 and mcj ≥ 4mcj+1 − 2, j = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Proof. We show first that mck ≥ 2. Since n ≥ 3 it holds that mck ≥ 3 if k = 1. Consider the case
k ≥ 2 and suppose mck = 1. A member of ck−1 has payoﬀ V s, whereas creating a link with the
unique member of ck leads to payoﬀÃ
mck−1 − 1p
mck−1 − 1 + 1
p
mck−1 − 1
+
1p
mck−1 − 1 + 1
!
V s =
p
mck−1 − 1 + 1√mck−1
V s,
a term larger than V s. Since obviously the unique member of ck wants to link with a member of
ck−1, we obtain a contradiction. Consequently, it holds that mck ≥ 2.
Consider a component with m members. No member wants to delete a link, for the current
payoﬀ for such an agent is V s, whereas deleting a link would reduce it to 0 when m equals 2 and to
m−2√
(m−2)(m−1)
V s
when m ≥ 3.
Consider two distinct components, let one component have cmembers and the otherm. A player
in the c-sized component looses from establishing a link with a member of the m-sized component
if and only if
c− 1p
c(c− 1)
+
1√
cm
< 1,
which is equivalent to 1/
√
m <
√
c−
√
c− 1. The latter expression is equivalent tom > 4c−2−1/m.
Using that m is an integer larger than or equal to 2, this last expression is equivalent to m ≥ 4c−2.
Notice that, unless n = 7, the collection of pairwise stable networks described in Proposition 2
contains the pairwise stable networks in the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). It
is a subset of the collection of pairwise stable networks under high link specificity (ρ = 1, Section
2.2).
For ρ = 1/2 we did not find any other pairwise stable communication networks. In particular,
it is not hard to verify that neither regular communication networks with d < n− 1 nor any of the
example networks in Figures 2, 3, or 4 are stable when ρ = 1/2.
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3 Informational as well as social value
This section introduces the case in which both social and informational value is derived from
communication in networks. Thus, we can illustrate the impact of value transferability on commu-
nication structure in combination with the eﬀect of link specificity. Value transferability (Bala and
Goyal, 2000) means that value from communication is not only derived by direct neighbors, but can
also be transferred via indirect links. More specifically, we make a distinction between social and
informational value derived from communication, where only informational value is transferable
through the network. For example, social value from communication between two Saab enthusiasts
only exists for the two communication partners, but informational value (e.g., from a solution to
a technical problem) can exist for others in the network. After proposing a model for network
formation in this setting, the pairwise stable networks are characterized again. We show that the
set of stable communication networks is much more limited in range than in the purely social value
setting (Section 2).
3.1 Model
A communication network is described by (N, g), where N = {1, . . . , n} , n ≥ 3, is a community
of agents. A direct link gi,j between agents i and j in this community (i, j ∈ N ; i 6= j) can be
interpreted as a communication relationship between i and j which is established if they both
wish the link. These relationships are expressed by undirected links: for any two agents i and j,
gi,j = gj,i, and gi,i = 0.
In case of an isolated relationship between two agents where interaction only has social value,
each agent experiences social value V s > 0 as the outcome of their joint communication production
process. In case of an isolated relationship between two agents where interaction only has infor-
mational value, each agent experiences informational value V i > 0 as the outcome of their joint
communication production process. In general, agents are assumed to give relative attention to
informational and social value in the proportions α and 1− α respectively, where α is assumed to
be constant satisfying 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Again we assume that the contributions of two agents in their bilateral process of communication
value creation are reflected by a Cobb-Douglas production function with both output elasticities
equal to ρ, where ρ = 1 corresponds to the case of high link specificity and ρ = 1/2 coincides with
constant returns to scale and results in low link specificity.
Moreover, informational value is, without any decay except for this eﬀort division, transferred
to third parties through indirect links (paths of links), whereas social value is not transferable. This
is due to the fact that in the direct communication production process of two agents, any of them
can use the informational value that she acquired during the bilateral communication creation with
other neighbors. Consequently, agent j0 experiences not only first-step informational payoﬀ from
her direct neighbors:
Π1ij0(g) =
P
j1∈Nj0 (g)
V i
(μj0 (g)·μj1(g))
ρ ,
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which is similar to the social payoﬀ in equation (1), but also second-step informational payoﬀ:
Π2ij0(g) =
P
j1∈Nj0(g)
1
(μj0(g)·μj1(g))
ρ
P
j2∈Nj1 (g)\{j0}
V i
(μj1 (g)·μj2(g))
ρ ,
third-step informational payoﬀ:
Π3ij0(g) =
P
j1∈Nj0(g)
1
(μj0(g)·μj1(g))
ρ
P
j2∈Nj1 (g)\{j0}
1
(μj1 (g)·μj2(g))
ρ
P
j3∈Nj2 (g)\{j1,j0}
V i
(μj2 (g)·μj3 (g))
ρ ,
and so forth, thus the overall informational payoﬀ for j0 is equal to
Πij0(g) =
n−1P
q=1
Πqij0(g) = V
i
n−1P
q=1
qQ
r=1
P
jr∈Njr−1 (g)\{jr−2,jr−3,...,j0}
1
μjr−1 (g)·μjr (g)
ρ
=
n−1P
q=1
P
jq∈Njq−1 (g)\{jq−2,jq−3,...,j0}
V i#
μj0(g)·
q−1Q
r=1
(μjr (g))
2·μjq (g)
$ρ .
Therefore, the total payoﬀ for agent i in communication network g is given by
Πi (g) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
α
P
j∈N¯i(g)
P
p∈Pi,j(g)
V i#
μi(g)·
Q
k∈p˘
(μk(g))
2·μj(g)
$ρ
+(1− α)
P
j∈Ni(g)
V s
(μi(g)·μj(g))
ρ
if μi (g) > 0
0 if μi (g) = 0,
(8)
where α is the proportion of communication through each link in the community that concerns
information and 1−α is the proportion of communication through each link in the community that
concerns social interaction; N¯i (g) is the set of agents with whom i has either a direct or an indirect
link; Pi,j (g) is the set of paths between i and j, and p˘ is the set of agents on path p between i and
j ; and V i > 0 denotes the informational value that i would derive from communication with j if
neither i nor j were linked to any other agent and interaction would only have informational value,
and V s > 0 denotes the social value that i would derive from communication with j if neither i
nor j were linked to any other agent and interaction would only have social value.
For the model thus described we again use the concept of pairwise stability (Jackson and
Wolinsky, 1996) to predict which communication networks are stable.
3.2 Stable networks under high link specificity
For ρ = 1 and 0 < α < 1, it is proven that the pairwise stable communication networks consist of
two- and three-agent star components only.3 First consider the following lemma in which we show
3The results in the case where the value derived from communication is only informational (α = 1) slightly diﬀer
from those in this mixed case (0 < α < 1). Specifically, it appears that networks also containing one four-agent star
component can be pairwise stable.
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that the star communication network becomes unstable when there are more than three agents.
Lemma 2 When ρ = 1 and 0 < α < 1, the star communication network is pairwise stable if and
only if n = 3.
Proof. From the star network, it is not beneficial for any of the periphery agents to delete her
link with the center agent as then her payoﬀ will be zero. For the center agent, deleting a link
with any of the periphery agents will provide her with the same payoﬀ, since she is not involved in
any indirect links to other agents. Periphery agent i does not create a link with another periphery
agent i’ if and only if this would not decrease her payoﬀ:
αV i
³
1
n−1 +
n−2
(n−1)2
´
+ (1− α)V s 1n−1 ≥
αV i
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1
2(n−1) +
1
8(n−1)| {z }
(a)
+ 14 +
1
4(n−1)2| {z }
(b)
+ n−3
2(n−1)2 +
n−3
8(n−1)2| {z }
(c)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠+ (1− α)V
s
³
1
2(n−1) +
1
4
´
⇐⇒ αV i (4− n) + (1− α)V s (3− n) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ n ≤ 3,
where the informational payoﬀ elements on the right-hand side of the first inequality are derived
from (a) the center agent, (b) agent i’, and (c) the other periphery agents consecutively. Since we
assumed communities to consist of at least three agents, it holds that n = 3.
Now the main result can be proven by tracking that when high link specificity is reinforced by
value transferability, it is beneficial for agents in communication networks to break cycles and to
delete links with tree branches that are longer than one link.
Proposition 3 When ρ = 1 and 0 < α < 1, a communication network is pairwise stable if and
only if it consists of disjoint star components of two or three agents.
Proof. (⇐=) It is not beneficial for any of the periphery agents in a two- or three-agent star
component to delete her single link as then her payoﬀ will be zero. Equivalently, for the center
agent in a three-agent component, deleting a link with any of the two periphery agents is not
beneficial as it will provide her with the same payoﬀ.
Link creation between the periphery agents of one three-agent star is eliminated by Lemma 2.
Therefore, we only have to examine the following cases (a)− (f) related to link formation between
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two agents in diﬀerent components:
pair agent center agent
of 3-agent star
periphery agent
of 3-agent star
pair agent
(a) (b) (c)
center agent
of 3-agent star
x (d) (e)
periphery agent
of 3-agent star
x x (f)
For each of these cases, it can be proven by evaluating the payoﬀs with and without the link that
no link is created: after forming a link in case (a), a pair agent would get payoﬀ
αV i
¡
1
2 +
1
4 +
1
8
¢
+ (1− α)V s
¡
1
2 +
1
4
¢
≤ αV i + (1− α)V s,
after forming a link in case (b), the pair agent would get payoﬀ
αV i
¡
1
2 +
1
6 +
1
18 +
1
18
¢
+ (1− α)V s
¡
1
2 +
1
6
¢
< αV i + (1− α)V s,
after forming a link in case (c), the pair agent would get payoﬀ
αV i
¡
1
2 +
1
4 +
1
16 +
1
32
¢
+ (1− α)V s
¡
1
2 +
1
4
¢
< αV i + (1− α)V s,
after forming a link in case (d), a center agent would get payoﬀ
αV i
¡
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
9 +
1
27 +
1
27
¢
+ (1− α)V s
¡
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
9
¢
≤ αV i
¡
1
2 +
1
2
¢
+ (1− α)V s
¡
1
2 +
1
2
¢
,
after forming a link in case (e), the center agent would get payoﬀ
αV i
¡
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
6 +
1
24 +
1
48
¢
+ (1− α)V s
¡
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
6
¢
< αV i
¡
1
2 +
1
2
¢
+ (1− α)V s
¡
1
2 +
1
2
¢
,
and after forming a link in case (f), a periphery agent would get payoﬀ
αV i
¡
1
4 +
1
4 +
1
8 +
1
16 +
1
32
¢
+ (1− α)V s
¡
1
4 +
1
4
¢
≤ αV i
¡
1
2 +
1
4
¢
+ (1− α)V s 12 .
(=⇒) For this part of the proof, we need some extra notation. The payoﬀ function in (8) can
be rewritten as
Πi (g) = 1μi(g)
P
j∈Ni(g)
Ti,j (g) ,
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where Ti,j (g) is the total payoﬀ that j transmits to i via her direct link with i. Formally,
Ti,j (g) = α
⎛
⎝ V i
μj(g)
+
P
(j0∈N¯j(g)\{i})
P
(p∈Pj,j0(g):i/∈p˘)
V i
μj0(g)·(μj(g))
2·
Q
k∈p˘
(μk(g))
2
⎞
⎠+ (1− α) V sμj(g) .
Assume that g is a pairwise stable network. Let i be an agent in g and k ∈ Ni (g) be such that
Ti,k (g) = min
j∈Ni(g)
Ti,j (g) .
Suppose that there exists an agent c ∈ Ni (g) for whom it holds that
Ti,c (g) > Ti,k (g) .
Deleting the link between i and k results in network g0, where it holds that
Ti,j
¡
g0
¢
≥ Ti,j (g) , ∀j ∈ Ni
¡
g0
¢
,
since k, to whom j might be (in)directly linked, has one costly direct link less, so more informational
value might flow from j to i via k. The payoﬀ for i then becomes
Πi
¡
g0
¢
= 1μi(g)−1
P
j∈Ni(g0)
Ti,j
¡
g0
¢
> 1μi(g)
P
j∈Ni(g)
Ti,j (g) = Πi (g) ,
which contradicts pairwise stability of g. It follows that
Ti,j (g) = Ti,j0 (g) , ∀j, j0 ∈ Ni (g) . (9)
Next, suppose that g contains a cycle, meaning that there exists a sequence of agents k1, ..., kn ∈
N for whom it holds that gk1,k2 = gk2,k3 = ... = gkn−1,kn = gkn,k1 = 1. Let i be an agent in this
cycle. Deleting the link with one of i’s neighbors in the cycle, say k, results in g0, where it holds
for the other neighbor of i in the cycle, say m, that
Ti,m
¡
g0
¢
> Ti,m (g) ,
since k, to whom m is (in)directly linked, has one costly direct link less, so more informational
value flows from k to i via m. Moreover,
Ti,j
¡
g0
¢
≥ Ti,j (g) , ∀j ∈ Ni
¡
g0
¢
.
The payoﬀ for i then becomes
Πi
¡
g0
¢
= 1μi(g)−1
P
j∈Ni(g0)
Ti,j
¡
g0
¢
> 1μi(g)−1
P
j∈Ni(g0)
Ti,j (g) = 1μi(g)
P
j∈Ni(g)
Ti,j (g) = Πi (g) ,
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where the second equality follows from equation (9). This implies that g is not pairwise stable,
leading to a contradiction. We have therefore shown that g does not contain any cycle.
Since we have already shown that g contains no cycles, all components of g are trees. In a tree
the number of links is one less than the number of agents. Moreover, in a tree there is a unique
path between any two agents. A tree that is not a star contains an agent, say i, with a neighbor
h that only has i as a neighbor, and, moreover, i is directly linked to an agent j who has another
neighbor diﬀerent from i. According to equation (9) it holds that
Ti,h(g) = Ti,j(g). (10)
Since h has only one neighbor, i, it follows that
Ti,h(g) = αV i + (1− α)V s.
We now evaluate Ti,j(g) and show it is smaller than Ti,h(g).
Think of the component to which h belongs as a tree with h as top agent, denoted N¯h(g). For
players k, k0 ∈ N¯h(g), k 6= k0, player k0 is a subordinate of k, denoted k0 ∈ S¯(k), if k is on the unique
path from h to k0. Player k0 is a direct subordinate of k, denoted k0 ∈ S(k), if k0 is a subordinate
of k and there is a link between k and k0. We write
Ti,j(g) = αT ii,j(g) + (1− α)T si,j(g),
where
T si,j(g) =
V s
μj(g)
≤ V s2 , (11)
and
T ii,j(g) =
V i
μj(g)
+
P
k∈S¯(j)
V i
μk(g)(μj(g))2
Q
k0∈p˘j,k
(μk0(g))2
,
where pj,k is the unique path between j and k.
Consider k ∈ S¯(i). We define the informational payoﬀ that k receives from its subordinates by
U ik(g) =
1
μk(g)
P
k0∈S(k)
T ik,k0(g),
where T ik,k0(g) is defined analogously to T
i
i,j(g). We obtain a recursive relation by observing that
T ik,k0(g) =
V i+U i
k0(g)
μk0(g)
.
We show by induction that
U ik(g) ≤ V i(μk(g)− 1), (12)
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from which it follows that
T ik,k0(g) ≤
V i+V i(μk0(g)−1)
μk0(g)
= V i,
and, consequently,
T ii,j(g) ≤ V i. (13)
Let K0 ⊂ N¯h(g) be the set of agents without subordinates. For m ≥ 1, let Km be the set of
agents with all subordinates in K0 ∪ · · ·∪Km−1. Let m0 be the smallest integer for which j ∈ Km0 .
First consider an agent k in K0, the set of agents without subordinates. Then U ik(g) = 0 =
V i(μk(g)− 1), so (12) is satisfied.
Suppose that (12) holds for agents in Km, m < m0. Consider an agent k ∈ Km+1.
U ik(g) =
1
μk(g)
P
k0∈S(k)
T ik,k0(g) ≤ 1μk(g)
P
k0∈S(k)
³
V i+V i(μk0(g)−1)
μk0(g)
´
= μk(g)−1μk(g)
V i ≤ 12V
i(μk(g)− 1),
so (12) holds for all k ∈ S¯(i).
Combining (11) and (13) implies Ti,j(g) < Ti,h(g), a contradiction to equation (10), so g consists
of star components only.
The proof of Lemma 2 implies that these stars have at most three agents. “Stars” of a single
agent cannot be part of g, for it is always strictly beneficial for this single agent to create a link
to the center agent of another star, whereas this center agent is indiﬀerent or improves if she is
isolated too.
Table 1 pictures all communication networks thus proven to be pairwise stable in the case with
both social and informational value from communication and ρ = 1 for n ≤ 6. Comparing these
results to the purely social value case (Section 2.2), clearly a much smaller range of very fragmented
networks turns out to be pairwise stable in the mixed case where transferable informational value
also plays a role. Specifically, even with α slightly above zero, regular communication networks are
never pairwise stable and also the example networks in Figures 2, 3, and 4 are not stable anymore.
n = 3
n = 4
n = 5
n = 6
Table 1: Pairwise stable communication networks for ρ = 1 and α > 0
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This may seem counter-intuitive, since apparently transferability of informational value causes
networks to become more fragmented and therefore less able to transfer information. The intuition
behind this finding is that the link specificity property of communication is now strong enough to
prevent individuals from maintaining many links since it is strengthened by the transferability of
informational value. For example, in a wheel network of three agents, an agent cannot improve
(or decrease) her social payoﬀ by deleting one of her links, but she can improve her informational
payoﬀ:
V i
2 +
V i
4 >
2V i
4 +
2V i
16 .
The co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) also contains a type of link specificity,
but since it is not combined with value transferability, the resulting stable networks are not as
fragmented. Similarly, the connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) contains value trans-
ferability, but since it is not combined with link specificity, the resulting networks are not fragmented
at all. Likewise, most studies reveal less fragmented stable networks, e.g., Goyal & Vega-Redondo
(2007) find large star networks in their setting of structural holes. Therefore, our model can explain
real-life phenomena like marriage and the evolvement of threads in online communities into strong
reciprocal ties (as empirically observed by Fisher et al., 2006).
3.3 Stable networks under low link specificity
For ρ = 1/2, we prove that the complete communication network is pairwise stable by retracing
that also with value transferability it is never beneficial for an agent in the complete network to
delete one of her links under this low level of link specificity.
Proposition 4 When ρ = 1/2 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the complete communication network is pairwise
stable.
Proof. We normalize payoﬀs by setting V i = 1. For α = 1, the payoﬀ for an agent in the complete
network is
1 +
n−1P
q=2
qQ
r=2
(n−r)
(n−1)q−1 ,
where q indicates the step level, and if she deletes a link her payoﬀ becomes
1+2(n−2)
√
n−2√
n−1
n−1 +
n−1P
q=3
qQ
r=3
(n−r)
(n−1)q−1
³
1 + n
2−5n+q+4√
n−1
√
n−2
´
,
where the first term combines payoﬀs resulting from paths with length 1 and 2. Subtracting the
latter from the former gives
n−1P
q=3
⎛
⎜⎝
qQ
r=3
(n−r)
(n−1)q−1
³
n− 3− n2−5n+q+4√n−1√n−2
´
+
2(n−2)−2(n−2)
√
n−2√
n−1
(n−1)(n−3)
⎞
⎟⎠ . (14)
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We have to prove that (14) is nonnegative. Multiplying by (n− 1), we find that it is suﬃcient to
show that
n−1P
q=3
µµ qQ
r=3
n−r
n−1
¶
(n− 3− n2−5n+q+4√n−1√n−2 ) +
2(n−2)
n−3 −
2(n−2)2
(n−3)
√
n−1
√
n−2
¶
≥ 0. (15)
When we define
a(q) =
qQ
r=3
n−r
n−1 ,
b(q) = n− 3− n2−5n+q+4√n−1√n−2 ,
then the first term in (15) is given by
n−1P
q=3
a(q)b(q).
The second minus the third term in (15) is positive. We show by means of contradiction that the
first term is nonnegative. Suppose the first term is negative, implying n ≥ 4.
Notice that a(q) ≥ 0 and b(q) is decreasing in q, so there is q¯ ≥ 3 such that 3 ≤ q < q¯ implies
a(q)b(q) ≥ 0 and q¯ ≤ q ≤ n− 1 implies a(q)b(q) < 0. This fact together with the supposition
n−1P
q=3
a(q)b(q) < 0,
implies that
n−1P
q=3
a(q)b(q) >
n−1P
q=3
λ(q)a(q)b(q)
for coeﬃcients λ(q) larger than or equal to 1 and nondecreasing in q. We define
λ(q) =
q−1Q
r=3
n−1
n−r ,
with λ(3) = 1 by definition. Then we have obtained the desired contradiction once we show that
n−1P
q=3
³
n−q
n−1(n− 3−
n2−5n+q+4√
n−1
√
n−2 ) +
2(n−2)
n−3 −
2(n−2)2
(n−3)
√
n−1
√
n−2
´
≥ 0.
It holds that
n−1P
q=3
n−q
n−1(n− 3) =
(n−2)(n−3)2
2(n−1) ,
n−1P
q=3
n−q
n−1
n2−5n+4√
n−1
√
n−2 =
(n−2)(n−3)(n−4)
2
√
n−1
√
n−2 ,
n−1P
q=3
n−q
n−1
q√
n−1
√
n−2 =
n(n−3)(n+2)
2(n−1)
√
n−1
√
n−2 −
2n3−3n2+n−30
6(n−1)
√
n−1
√
n−2 ,
n−1P
q=3
2(n−2)
n−3 −
2(n−2)2
(n−3)
√
n−1
√
n−2 = 2(n− 2)−
2(n−2)2√
n−1
√
n−2 ,
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where for the third inequality we use the fact that 12 + 22 + · · · + r2 = 13r3 + 12r2 + 16r. After
multiplying by 6 and rewriting we obtain the inequality
3n3−12n2+27n−30
n−1 −
3n4−17n3+45n2−73n+54
(n−1)
√
n−1
√
n−2 ≥ 0.
The expression on the left-hand side exceeds
3n3−12n2+27n−30
n−1 −
3n4−17n3+45n2−73n+54
(n−1)(n−8
5
)
.
Cross multiplying, we find that the last expression is larger than or equal to zero if and only if
3n4 − 1645n
3 + 4615n
2 − 7315n+ 48 ≥ 3n
4 − 17n3 + 45n2 − 73n+ 54.
For n ≥ 4, such is clearly the case. Thus, the complete network is pairwise stable for α = 1.
Since it follows from Proposition 2 that the complete network is stable for α = 0 and given the
linear combination in equation (8), the complete network is pairwise stable for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The following example illustrates that already at relatively low α, multi-component communi-
cation networks (cf. Proposition 2 for α = 0) are not pairwise stable anymore.
i k 
Figure 5: A communication network that is pairwise stable when ρ = 1/2 and α = 0
Example 6 Assume ρ = 1/2 and consider the communication network in Figure 5. When α = 0,
the current payoﬀ for agent i is V s and if she would create a link with agent k it would become¡
1/
√
2 + 1/
√
12
¢
V s ≈ 0.99578V s. When α = 1, the payoﬀ for i is V i and with a link to k would
become
¡
1/
√
2 + 1/
√
12 + 523/250
√
10
¢
V i ≈ 1.65733V i. When 0 < α < 1, the payoﬀ for i is
αV i + (1− α)V s and with a link to k would become
1.65733αV i + 0.99578(1− α)V s,
which for V i = V s exceeds the current payoﬀ if α > 0.0064. Since k is willing to create a link with
i for any α, it holds that this network is not pairwise stable when α > 0.0064.
21
4 Eﬃciency
In this section, the structural results from the previous sections are assessed by their impact on
eﬃciency. We define the eﬃciency of a network as the sum of payoﬀs for all agents.4 It appears
that the fragmented stable communication networks under high link specificity as well as the dense
stable communication networks under low link specificity can be most eﬃcient in their own setting.
Therefore, although not all pairwise stable communication networks found for ρ = 1 and ρ = 1/2
are most eﬃcient, we conclude in contrast to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), that stability and
eﬃciency are compatible.
Definition 9 (eﬃciency) The eﬃciency provided by network g is given by
W (g) =
X
i∈N
Πi (g) .
We conjecture that for ρ = 1/2, the densification that characterizes the pairwise stable commu-
nication networks has a generally beneficial influence on eﬃciency, as well as that for ρ = 1, the
fragmentation that characterizes the pairwise stable communication networks whenever α > 0 has
a generally beneficial influence on eﬃciency.5
Conjecture 1 (i) When ρ = 1 and n is even, a communication network consisting of disjoint pair
components is most eﬃcient, and when ρ = 1 and n is odd, a communication network consisting
of one three-agent star component and furthermore disjoint pair components is most eﬃcient.
(ii) When ρ = 1/2, the complete communication network is most eﬃcient.
For tractability, we proof the conjecture for low n and for the class of communication networks
having only complete components.
Proposition 5 Conjecture 1 holds when n = 3, 4, 5, or 6.
Proof. Table 2 lists the normalized eﬃciency for α = 1 and α = 0 at ρ = 1/2 and ρ = 1 for
all possible nonisomorphic communication networks when n = 3, 4, 5, and 6, ordered according to
their eﬃciency level at α = 1, ρ = 1/2. Given the linear combination in equation 8, the conjecture
is hereby proven for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and n = 3, 4, 5, or 6.
Proposition 6 Consider the class of communication networks consisting of fully connected com-
ponents c1, . . . , ck. When mcj is the number of members of cj , the following holds.
(i) When ρ = 1/2, g is most eﬃcient in this class when k = 1 and mc1 = n, so g is complete.
(ii) When ρ = 1 and n is even, g is most eﬃcient when k = n/2 and mcj = 2 for all j, so g
consists of disjoint pairs.6
4Alternatively, it may be interesting to study the structural eﬀects on the actual amount of information exchanged,
thus disregarding the value derived from social aspects of communication.
5For α = 0, pairwise stable communication networks tend to be overconnected, cf. Morrill (2010) and Section 5.
6Notice that for odd n, the most eﬃcient communication network as predicted by Conjecture 1 includes a compo-
nent that is not complete.
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α = 1 α = 0
ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1 ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1
n = 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
3.828 2.500 2.828 2.000 3-agent star
4.500 1.875 3.000 1.500 complete
n = 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
3.828 2.500 2.828 2.000
4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 2 disjoint pairs
4.500 1.875 3.000 1.500
5.464 2.667 3.464 2.000
5.743 3.125 3.828 2.500
6.352 2.333 3.788 1.833
7.000 2.625 4.000 2.000
7.121 1.975 3.933 1.556
7.556 1.663 4.000 1.333 complete
n = 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
3.828 2.500 2.828 2.000
4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
4.500 1.875 3.000 1.500
5.464 2.667 3.464 2.000
5.743 3.125 3.828 2.500
5.828 4.500 4.828 4.000 3-agent star +
6.352 2.333 3.788 1.833 disjoint pair
6.500 3.875 5.000 3.500
7.000 2.625 4.000 2.000
α = 1 α = 0
ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1 ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1
n = 5 7.000 2.750 4.000 2.000
cont. 7.121 1.975 3.933 1.556
7.394 3.389 4.540 2.667
7.556 1.663 4.000 1.333
7.700 3.781 4.828 3.000
7.993 2.594 4.414 2.000
8.232 2.815 4.609 2.222
8.298 3.097 4.864 2.500
8.829 3.042 4.788 2.333
8.909 2.337 4.625 1.833
8.993 2.508 4.828 2.000
9.035 2.503 4.788 2.000
9.375 3.320 5.000 2.500
9.407 2.071 4.732 1.667
9.654 2.648 4.933 2.056
9.676 2.062 4.743 1.625
9.826 2.166 4.966 1.778
9.865 2.620 4.869 1.722
10.245 2.261 4.899 2.000
10.257 1.709 4.890 1.514
10.570 1.762 4.976 1.556
10.766 1.794 4.964 1.375
11.094 1.849 5.000 1.250 complete
n = 6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
3.828 2.500 2.828 2.000
α = 1 α = 0
ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1 ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1
n = 6 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
cont. 4.500 1.875 3.000 1.500
5.464 2.667 3.464 2.000
5.743 3.125 3.828 2.500
5.828 4.500 4.828 4.000
6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 3 disjoint pairs
6.352 2.333 3.788 1.833
6.500 3.875 5.000 3.500
7.000 2.625 4.000 2.000
7.000 2.750 4.000 2.000
7.121 1.975 3.933 1.556
7.394 3.389 4.540 2.667
7.464 4.667 5.464 4.000
7.556 1.663 4.000 1.333
7.657 5.000 5.657 4.000
7.700 3.781 4.828 3.000
7.743 5.125 5.828 4.500
7.993 2.594 4.414 2.000
8.232 2.815 4.609 2.222
8.298 3.097 4.864 2.500
8.328 4.375 5.828 3.500
8.352 4.333 5.788 3.833
8.472 2.800 4.472 2.000
8.829 3.042 4.788 2.333
8.909 2.337 4.625 1.833
α = 1 α = 0
ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1 ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1
n = 6 8.932 3.531 5.121 2.750
cont. 8.993 2.508 4.828 2.000
9.000 4.625 6.000 4.000
9.000 3.750 6.000 3.000
9.035 2.503 4.788 2.000
9.047 3.728 5.285 2.889
9.121 3.975 5.933 3.556
9.352 4.125 5.616 3.333
9.358 4.069 5.540 3.167
9.375 3.320 5.000 2.500
9.407 2.071 4.732 1.667
9.526 2.760 4.948 2.100
9.556 3.663 6.000 3.333
9.654 2.648 4.933 2.056
9.676 2.062 4.743 1.625
9.678 4.445 5.828 3.500
9.826 2.166 4.869 1.722
9.865 2.620 4.899 2.000
9.882 3.097 5.256 2.417
9.937 3.398 5.536 2.750
9.955 3.469 5.609 2.722
10.099 3.317 5.464 2.667
10.204 3.586 5.685 2.889
10.245 2.261 4.966 1.778
10.257 1.880 4.890 1.514
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α = 1 α = 0
ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1 ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1
n = 6 10.271 3.788 5.864 3.000
cont. 10.450 3.281 5.414 2.500
10.529 2.578 5.203 2.000
10.570 1.943 4.976 1.556
10.586 2.765 5.424 2.200
10.645 3.468 5.575 2.667
10.645 3.494 5.609 2.722
10.701 2.824 5.454 2.222
10.709 2.707 5.328 2.125
10.766 1.688 4.964 1.375
10.824 2.877 5.500 2.306
10.824 3.802 5.864 3.000
10.865 3.224 5.933 2.556
10.870 3.161 5.746 2.583
10.894 3.024 5.670 2.417
10.971 3.034 5.643 2.444
11.014 3.287 5.864 2.667
11.066 2.352 5.338 1.867
11.094 1.516 5.000 1.250
11.151 3.722 5.788 2.833
11.271 2.485 5.476 2.014
11.368 2.907 5.853 2.417
11.401 2.356 5.360 1.850
11.410 2.994 5.625 2.333
11.471 3.189 5.828 2.500
11.487 3.126 5.754 2.444
α = 1 α = 0
ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1 ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1
n = 6 11.537 2.464 5.492 1.956
cont. 11.593 3.170 5.788 2.500
11.597 2.619 5.679 2.100
11.604 2.943 5.571 2.250
11.616 2.626 5.638 2.125
11.625 3.996 6.000 3.000
11.647 2.560 5.593 2.042
11.716 2.773 5.869 2.222
11.761 2.717 5.744 2.194
11.765 3.130 5.754 2.444
12.004 3.318 5.933 2.556
12.024 2.203 5.535 1.772
12.045 2.640 5.678 2.083
12.104 2.660 5.698 2.111
12.128 2.786 5.821 2.222
12.133 2.417 5.814 1.967
12.143 2.306 5.646 1.875
12.149 2.126 5.460 1.680
12.197 2.452 5.785 2.014
12.217 2.699 5.743 2.125
12.218 3.319 5.933 2.556
12.331 2.825 5.933 2.222
12.348 3.285 5.899 2.500
12.362 2.269 5.627 1.822
12.363 2.815 5.869 2.222
12.373 2.762 5.835 2.167
α = 1 α = 0
ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1 ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1
n = 6 12.410 2.292 5.669 1.833
cont. 12.434 2.358 5.720 1.903
12.528 2.605 5.657 2.000
12.551 2.381 5.780 1.911
12.567 2.746 5.815 2.139
12.576 2.347 5.743 1.875
12.583 2.031 5.631 1.658
12.591 2.436 5.857 1.958
12.664 2.125 5.732 1.750
12.688 2.912 5.966 2.278
12.792 2.510 5.890 2.014
12.830 2.026 5.662 1.636
12.912 2.863 5.933 2.222
12.938 1.870 5.683 1.550
12.956 2.456 5.857 1.958
12.962 2.430 5.837 1.931
12.974 2.089 5.745 1.692
13.006 2.481 5.922 1.972
13.018 2.863 5.933 2.222
13.035 2.161 5.844 1.756
13.041 2.153 5.828 1.750
13.076 2.397 5.805 1.889
13.207 2.522 5.942 2.000
13.270 2.142 5.824 1.728
13.332 2.498 5.922 1.972
13.361 2.186 5.890 1.764
α = 1 α = 0
ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1 ρ = 1
2
ρ = 1
n = 6 13.448 1.893 5.780 1.547
cont. 13.473 2.222 5.910 1.792
13.478 2.206 5.915 1.778
13.506 2.541 6.000 2.000
13.509 1.942 5.865 1.591
13.541 1.943 5.852 1.592
13.566 2.182 5.878 1.750
13.616 2.215 5.952 1.778
13.730 2.234 5.964 1.792
13.838 1.979 5.920 1.614
13.842 1.758 5.848 1.455
13.852 2.555 6.000 2.000
13.861 1.993 5.914 1.625
13.912 2.242 5.964 1.792
13.967 1.969 5.908 1.600
13.976 1.747 5.848 1.440
14.058 2.000 5.964 1.625
14.069 1.783 5.909 1.472
14.122 2.018 5.976 1.639
14.305 1.813 5.960 1.492
14.411 1.639 5.932 1.365
14.484 1.827 6.000 1.500
14.602 1.660 5.978 1.380
14.797 1.524 5.978 1.280
15.062 1.417 6.000 1.200 complete
Table 2: Normalized eﬃciency for all nonisomorphic communication networks when α = 1, 0,
ρ = 1/2, 1, and n = 3, 4, 5, 6
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Proof. Because of symmetry in a complete component it suﬃces to consider the payoﬀs for one
member and because of the linear combination in equation 8 it suﬃces to consider the cases α = 0
and α = 1.
(i) For ρ = 1/2 and α = 0, the normalized payoﬀ for an agent in component cj is 0 whenmcj = 1
and 1 when mcj ≥ 2. For ρ = 1/2 and α = 1, the normalized payoﬀ for an agent in component cj
is 0 when mcj = 1, 1 when mcj = 2 and
1 +
mcj−1P
q=2
qQ
r=2
(mcj−r)
(mcj−1)
q−1 = 1 +
mcj−1P
q=2
qQ
r=2
mcj−r
mcj−1
when mcj ≥ 3, which is 3/2 for mcj = 3 and increasing in mcj .
(ii) For ρ = 1 and α = 0, the normalized payoﬀ for an agent in component cj is 0 when mcj = 1
and 1/
¡
mcj − 1
¢
when mcj ≥ 2, which is 1 for mcj = 2 and decreasing in mcj . For ρ = 1 and α = 1,
the normalized payoﬀ for an agent in component cj is 0 when mcj = 1, 1 when mcj = 2 and
1
mcj−1
+
mcj−1P
q=2
qQ
r=2
(mcj−r)
(mcj−1)
2q−1 =
1 +
Pmcj−1
q=2
qQ
r=2
mcj−r
(mcj−1)
2
mcj − 1
when mcj ≥ 3, which is 5/8 for mcj = 3 and decreasing in mcj .
5 Other values of link specificity
In this section, other link specificity values than 1 and 1/2 are investigated by simulations of our
communication network formation model. They illustrate that 1 and 1/2 are indeed suitable polar
cases and that for intermediate values the common tension between stability and eﬃciency (e.g.,
Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is re-established.
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Pairwise stability
A simulation starts with a random network in the sense that for every i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, the link
gi,j is randomly chosen to be equal to 0 or 1.
In every iteration we randomly determine whether there will be an attempt to delete or create
a link. If this turns out to be delete, one agent is randomly drawn from the community and
subsequently another one. If there exists a link between these two agents, the first agent calculates
the payoﬀ she will earn when she deletes this link (equation (8)). If this is strictly higher than the
payoﬀ she earns with the current network, the link is deleted. If no link exists between the two
agents or the first agent does not gain by its deletion, the current network is maintained until the
next iteration.
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If the attempt appears to be create, two agents are randomly drawn from the community. If
no link exists between these two agents, they both calculate the payoﬀ they will earn when they
create such a link. If this is weakly higher for both agents and strictly higher for at least one of
them, the link is created. If there already exists a link between these two agents or one of them
loses or none of them gains by its creation, the current network is maintained.
In this way, 5,000 iterations are performed consecutively. Afterwards it is verified whether the
simulation converged to a pairwise stable network. We perform 500 of these simulations for each
of 15 (ρ = 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1.4, 1.5) x 3 (α = 0, 1/2, 1) parameter value combinations.
5.1.2 Local eﬃciency
We also perform simulations to compute locally eﬃcient communication networks. This is achieved
by repeating the procedure of Section 5.1.1, assuming that agents all hold eﬃciency as their objective
function (Definition 9). Pairwise stability after such a simulation establishes local eﬃciency.
Definition 10 The network g is locally eﬃcient if for all i, j ∈ N with gi,j = 1 it holds that
W (g) ≥W
¡
g0
¢
,
where g0 is such that g0i,j = 0 and g
0
k,l = gk,l for all {k, l} 6= {i, j}, and for all i, j ∈ N with gi,j = 0
it holds that
W (g) ≥W
¡
g0
¢
,
where g0 is such that g0i,j = 1 and g
0
k,l = gk,l for all {k, l} 6= {i, j}.
5.1.3 Further specifications
Community size n = 6 is chosen for all simulations, since it is large enough to illustrate interesting
tendencies as well as small enough to generate reasonable calculation times regarding the expo-
nentially increasing number of paths in the payoﬀ function (equation (8)). Furthermore, we take
V i = V s = 6. We have verified that our results are robust for the case with an odd number of
agents n = 5.
In order to compare simulation outcomes among levels of ρ and α, we use the density of a
network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.164):
D(g) =
Pn
i=1 μi (g)
n (n− 1) =
1
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6X
i=1
μi (g) .
For example, the empty network has density 0, a network consisting of three disjoint pair compo-
nents has density 0.2, a network consisting of two disjoint three-agent star components has density
0.27, a network consisting of a four-agent wheel component and a disjoint pair component or a
network consisting of a three-agent complete component and a disjoint three-agent star component
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has density 0.33, a wheel network or a network consisting of two disjoint complete three-agent com-
ponents has density 0.4, a network consisting of a complete four-agent component and a disjoint
pair component has density 0.47, a regular network with degree 3 has density 0.6, a regular network
with degree 4 has density 0.8, and the complete network has density 1.
Our intuitive prediction is that in general, a higher level of link specificity ρ makes communi-
cation more costly, and therefore the density of a simulated communication network lower. This
intuition is confirmed by the analytically found potential outcomes for the cases ρ = 1 and ρ = 1/2
(Sections 2 and 3). A higher level of focus on informational value α provides more value spillovers
from indirect links, and thus the expected density of a pairwise stable communication network
is higher. As noted at the end of Section 3.2, this intuition is not confirmed by the analytically
found potential outcomes: whereas in Section 2.2 a large range of possibly dense communication
networks is proven to be pairwise stable for ρ = 1 and α = 0, in Section 3.2 only very fragmented
communication networks turn out to be pairwise stable for ρ = 1 and α = 1.
5.2 Results
It appears that all 500 simulations in every setting converge to pairwise stable networks as described
in Section 5.1.1. Therefore, we deal with density and eﬃciency of these networks.
5.2.1 Density
For each combination of 15 levels of link specificity ρ and three levels of focus on informational
versus social value from communication α, the average density of the 500 simulated pairwise stable
and locally eﬃcient networks are given in Table 3 and represented in Figure 6.
ρ\α 0 12 1
pws locef pws locef pws locef
0.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.5 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.6 1.00 0.22 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.52
0.7 0.95 0.22 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.40
0.8 0.70 0.23 0.69 0.23 0.54 0.22
0.9 0.38 0.23 0.37 0.24 0.36 0.24
1.0 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24
1.1 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.24
1.2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23
1.3 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
1.4 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
1.5 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Table 3: Simulated eﬀect of ρ on density of pairwise stable and locally eﬃcient communication
networks for n = 6 and α = 0, 1/2, 1
The basic intuition about the eﬀect of ρ on density in communication networks is thus confirmed
by the simulation outcomes as it was by the analytical results of Sections 2 and 3, as the density
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Figure 6: Simulated eﬀect of ρ on density of pairwise stable and locally eﬃcient communication
networks for n = 6 and α = 0, 0.5, 1
of the pairwise stable networks is generally decreasing in ρ. Notice that this also roughly holds for
the local eﬃciency simulation outcomes, although a few small exceptions appear, for example at
ρ = 0.8.
The intuition about the eﬀect of α on density in communication networks is again contradicted
by the simulation outcomes, e.g., for ρ = 0.8 we find a higher average density for α = 1/2 (0.69)
than for α = 1 (0.54), and for ρ = 1.0 we find a higher average density for α = 0 (0.27) than for
α = 1/2 (0.23).7 This can again be ascribed to the interaction eﬀect of value transferability and
high link specificity (cf. end of Section 3.2). Notice that our intuition about the eﬀect of α on
density in communication networks is still confirmed by the local eﬃciency simulation outcomes,
in particular for ρ around 0.6.
The simulations confirm that ρ = 1 and ρ = 1/2 are suitable polar cases, since outside these
boundaries the simulated pairwise stable as well as locally eﬃcient communication networks largely
coincide with either the complete network or rather a network consisting of pairs only, whereas
in between we find large diﬀerences in density between the locally eﬃcient and pairwise stable
communication networks, where pairwise stable networks are more connected than locally eﬃcient
networks. Thus, for intermediate levels of ρ, the pairwise stable communication networks are
highly connected as with lower levels of link specificity, whereas the locally eﬃcient communication
networks are very fragmented as with higher levels of link specificity. The following example
elaborates such a case.
7Thus, for α = 0 the simulation process on average selects relatively sparse networks from the wide range of
pairwise stable networks, which reduces the conflict with intuition.
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Example 7 Let ρ = 3/4, α = 1/2. Table 4 provides an overview of the types and numbers of
pairwise stable communication networks resulting from 100 simulations and the types and numbers
of locally eﬃcient communication networks resulting from another 100 simulations.
pairwise stable networks
84 6
8 2
locally eﬃcient networks
67 9
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Table 4: Example of simulated communication networks
5.2.2 Eﬃciency
As a means to investigate to what extent the density diﬀerences between the locally eﬃcient and
pairwise stable communication networks actually lead to eﬃciency diﬀerences, the average eﬃ-
ciency of the 500 simulated pairwise stable and locally eﬃcient networks are given in Table 5 and
represented in Figure ?? for each parameter setting. For comparison, the expected eﬃciency from
a random network (based on 5000 randomly generated networks) and the maximum eﬃciency have
also been calculated for each setting.
ρ\α 0 1
2
1
pws locef rand max pws locef rand max pws locef rand max
0.1 130.5 130.5 73.4 130.5 1758.8 1758.8 274.3 1758.8 3387.2 3387.2 471.8 3387.2
0.2 94.6 94.6 59.9 94.6 601.3 601.3 160.3 601.3 1108.1 1108.1 258.8 1108.1
0.3 68.5 68.5 49.1 68.5 243.0 243.0 101.8 243.0 417.4 417.4 154.3 417.4
0.4 49.7 49.7 40.4 49.7 115.8 115.8 70.0 115.8 181.8 181.8 99.2 181.8
0.5 36.0 35.9 33.4 36.0 63.2 63.2 50.4 63.2 90.4 90.4 67.3 90.4
0.6 26.1 34.8 27.6 36.0 38.0 42.6 37.8 43.0 50.0 54.6 48.0 55.4
0.7 19.7 34.5 23.0 36.0 24.5 35.9 29.3 36.0 29.9 43.6 35.7 43.6
0.8 19.3 32.2 19.2 36.0 22.1 33.8 23.2 36.0 30.1 35.7 27.2 36.0
0.9 23.9 31.6 16.1 36.0 26.8 32.0 18.7 36.0 30.0 33.6 21.3 36.0
1.0 29.2 30.2 13.5 36.0 32.3 31.0 15.2 36.0 32.9 32.2 17.0 36.0
1.1 36.0 36.0 11.5 36.0 36.0 31.3 12.5 36.0 36.0 31.1 13.7 36.0
1.2 36.0 36.0 9.7 36.0 36.0 36.0 10.5 36.0 36.0 31.8 11.2 36.0
1.3 36.0 36.0 8.3 36.0 36.0 36.0 8.8 36.0 36.0 36.0 9.4 36.0
1.4 36.0 36.0 7.1 36.0 36.0 36.0 7.5 36.0 36.0 36.0 7.9 36.0
1.5 36.0 36.0 6.1 36.0 36.0 36.0 6.4 36.0 36.0 36.0 6.7 36.0
Table 5: Simulated eﬀect of ρ on eﬃciency of pairwise stable, locally eﬃcient, random, and optimal
communication networks for n = 6 and α = 0, 1/2, 1
Although we have seen in Section 5.2.1 that a higher α and thus more value transferability does
not always lead to more dense communication networks, it apparently does always lead to higher
eﬃciency, as the eﬃciency of the pairwise stable networks is increasing in α, even strictly so for
ρ ≤ 1.0.8
8Notice that this claim is dependent on the assumption V i = V s chosen for the simulations. For example, it can
be shown that for ρ = 1 and V s = xV i , α has an opposite eﬀect on eﬃciency if x > 5/4.
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Figure 7: Simulated eﬀect of ρ on eﬃciency of pairwise stable, locally eﬃcient, random, and optimal
communication networks for n = 6 and α = 0, 0.5, 1
Furthermore, though a lower ρ has been shown to lead to higher density in communication
networks, it only leads to subsequent higher eﬃciency when link specificity is low enough, since
for intermediate values of ρ, eﬃciency is much lower and partly even strictly increases in ρ. Thus,
a community should either specialize in the quantity (low ρ) or in the quality (high ρ) of her
communication.
Moreover, we find that the density diﬀerence between pairwise stability and local eﬃciency
in communication networks found for α = 0, ρ = 0.5 does not lead to a subsequent eﬃciency
diﬀerence, but for intermediate levels of link specificity (1/2 < ρ < 1), the tension between local
eﬃciency and pairwise stability is considerable (up to larger than 40% for α = 0 and ρ = 0.7, 0.8).
In the most extreme intervals (i.e., around ρ = 0.7), the simulated pairwise stable communication
networks are on average even less eﬃcient than a random network.
Interestingly, on the other hand a few parameter combinations exist where social preferences
appear to be harmful for eﬃciency in the sense that the simulated locally eﬃcient communication
networks are not globally optimal, whereas individual incentives do lead to maximum eﬃciency
(α = 1/2, ρ = 1.1 and α = 1, ρ = 1.1, 1.2).
6 Discussion
6.1 Summary
This paper has shown that the structure of bilateral communication links within communication
networks can be appropriately studied using a model based on the game-theoretic literature of social
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and economic network formation. A combination of important aspects common to communication
networks was incorporated that had not been investigated until now: the negative externality
of link specificity, which was neglected in the communication network context so far, and the
positive externality of informational value transferability, while previous research modeled all value
uniformly in this respect.
In the case of communication having nontransferable social value only (Section 2), illustrating
the separate impact of link specificity on structure, the set of pairwise stable communication net-
works was characterized for high link specificity and shown to include a wide range of non-standard
networks like highly connected and “small world” networks, whereas previous models for social
and economic network formation mostly predicted simple networks like stars and wheels. For low
link specificity, particular combinations of fully connected components were proven to be pairwise
stable communication networks in line with the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
In the case of communication from which both social and informational value is derived (Section
3), illustrating the joint impact of link specificity and value transferability on structure, under high
link specificity only networks that consist of disjoint star components of two or three agents were
shown to be pairwise stable. Herewith, we predict much more fragmentation than usually in the
literature about social and economic network formation, where mostly only either of these two
features was included. Under low link specificity, the opposite extreme eﬀect takes place: already
with small informational value transferability, multi-component communication networks may fail
to be pairwise stable.
Both the fragmentation under high link specificity and the dense pairwise stable communication
networks under low link specificity are most eﬃcient in their own setting (Section 4), whereas for
intermediate link specificity values quite ineﬃcient communication networks may arise (Section 5).
6.2 Implications
Intuition predicts that a higher level of link specificity ρ makes communication more costly, and
therefore stable communication networks will be sparser. This is confirmed by the analytical results
for the cases ρ = 1 and ρ = 1/2 (Sections 2 and 3) as well as by the simulation outcomes for other
ρ values (Section 5).
However, lower link specificity and thus higher density only leads to subsequent higher eﬃciency
when link specificity is low enough, since for intermediate values of ρ, eﬃciency is much lower
(Section 5). This implies that enhancing communication in the community by decreasing link
specificity from a high to an intermediate level results in lower eﬃciency from communication.
Although at first sight counterintuitive, these results are in line with the laws of specialization: a
community should either focus on quantity (low ρ) or on quality (high ρ) in her communication
eﬀorts.
A higher level of focus on transferable informational value α provides more value spillovers from
indirect links, so intuition predicts higher density for pairwise stable communication networks.
This is contradicted by the analytical results for ρ = 1 (Sections 2 and 3) and to a smaller extent
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by the simulation outcomes for relatively high ρ values (Section 5), which can be ascribed to the
interaction eﬀect of value transferability and high link specificity.
However, when the potential social and informational value present in a community are equal,
higher α does always lead to higher eﬃciency, even strictly so for ρ ≤ 1.0 (Section 5). Therefore,
stimulating the focus on informational value of communication can be a generally eﬀective tool for
boosting eﬃciency. In line with intuition, this eﬀectivity is larger the smaller ρ.
6.3 Further research
Future studies could introduce valuation heterogeneity in the sense that individuals represent dif-
ferent values for their fellows or have diﬀerent opinions on the values of their fellows, like Galeotti
et al. (2006) for standard communication network formation models. For example, when ρ = 1
and 0 < α < 1, if we assume a valuation pattern deviating from full homogeneity in the sense
that there is one agent j who is valued diﬀerently than all other agents, it can be proven that all
pairwise stable communication networks consist of small star components and one possibly larger
component without cycles containing the diﬀering agent j but not at the periphery. In particular,
this component may be a star component with agent j at the center.
Another extension of the current model could be to relax the assumption that agents divide
their available eﬀort equally among all their relationships, thus entering the subject of link strength
and dropping the common one-zero formulation of links. Bloch and Dutta (2009) performed such
a task for a diﬀerent setting with one-sided link formation and found rather similar results as in
their discrete variant. However, this similarity is partly ascribed to the assumption of a convex
relationship between individual eﬀort and link strength because of a fixed cost of link formation,
whereas in our model a linear relationship would be more in line with the assumed costs of link
maintenance rather than formation.
Besides, a possible follow-up would be to empirically examine the applicability of the used
payoﬀ function in diverse contexts. The model could be tested experimentally, contributing to an
emerging literature as surveyed by Kosfeld (2004).
Accordingly, we hope that our current work stimulates future research in the appealing area of
communication networks and the roles of aﬀecting link specificity as well as balancing nontransfer-
able social and transferable informational value.
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